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Implications and Consequences of Post-Modern Philosophy
for Contemporary Perspectives
on Transpersonal and Spiritual Experience
I. The Later Foucault and Pierre Hadot
on a Post-Socratic This-Worldly Mysticism
Harry Hunt

Brock University
Ontario, Canada
While Michel Foucault is chiefly known for his historical relativism and his critique of
modern institutional power over the individual, his late writings, as further extended by
Pierre Hadot, centered on the post-Socratic spiritual practices of the experience of here and
now presence or Being in the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics. For Foucault the positive,
expansive self-actualization common to these traditions, and contrasting with Christian
self-renunciation, offers a guidance for a contemporary spiritual crisis in valuation of the
person. For Hadot each of the post-Socratic traditions was based on the imitation and
further development of key characteristics of Socrates, much as the charismatic figure of
Jesus inspired the multiple forms of earliest Christianity. These post-Socratic practices of
the Hellenistic-Roman era are examples of what Max Weber termed a this- or inner-worldly
mysticism, in contrast to both the more other-worldly mysticisms of the East and the JudeoChristian prophetical traditions, and saw as the most likely line of spiritual renewal in the
modern secularized West. Examples of this form of spirituality are reflected in the Sufi
influenced Gurdjieff-Ouspensky movement, Jung’s Self, Maslow’s self-actualization, and the
Diamond-Heart approach of Almaas. Foucault and Hadot locate its specifically Western
historical geneaology, which, given Jung’s controversial concerns over adopting spiritualities
outside one’s own cultural tradition, may offer some context and direction amidst presently
contending New Age and transpersonal spiritual understandings.
Keywords: Stoicism, Epicureanism, Socrates, inner-worldly mysticism, numinous
experience, constructivism, presence, personal essence, Gurdjieff-Ouspensky, selfremembering, Nietzsche, early Christianity
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ichel Foucault (1926-1984) is best known for
his detailed analyses of the unprecedented
power of modern institutionalized knowledge
over an increasingly “objectified,” endlessly “accountable,”
and “normalized” individual, as best reflected in his
interpretive histories of prisons and madness (Discipline
and Punish, Madness and Civilization). His approach
here is broadly comparable to Heidegger (1949/2012)
on the “enframing” of a technological attitude in
which everything—including persons as well as natural
environment—becomes potential “commodity” for
a “calculative,” purely utilitarian attitude. It is also

reminiscent of the sociologist Max Weber (1922/1963;
Radkau, 2011) on the unique “rationalization” and
“disenchantment” of modern materially driven life (see
also Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).
Within a more formal philosophical context
Foucault is also known for his rejection of any universal
phenomenology of consciousness, understood in the
sense of Husserl, as primary or “constitutive” of meaning
and society—and which in transpersonal psychology is
sometimes seen as the underlying source for a mystical
core for all religions. For the early Foucault consciousness
and experience of self varies across historical eras and is
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itself largely constituted by the unconscious structures of
language, society, and economy (The Order of Things, The
Archeology of Knowledge). At this stage, consciousness
for Foucault was entirely epi-phenomenal—an afterthe-fact “fictive” construction (Jay, 2005). Foucault’s
(1972) rejection of what he termed the “transcendental
narcissism” of a primary phenomenology of consciousness was later still echoed in his distrust of what he
encountered personally in the 1980s as what he termed
the “California cult” of a “true self,” in the sense of a
universal structure to be simply uncovered by the
techniques of meditation and psychedelic drugs with
which he experimented at the time (Foucault, 1983a).
So it is interesting to find the later Foucault,
especially in his final lectures between 1981 and 1984
(The Hermeneutics of the Subject, The Government of
Self and Others, and The Courage of Truth) even more
than in his final books being edited at that time (The
Use of Pleasure, The Care of the Self ), returning to the
importance of the subject as part of his concentration
on the Post-Socratic, Hellenistic and Roman, spiritual
practices of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics. He
saw this tradition of cultivating a “care of the self”
or “aesthetics of existence” as offering an alternative
guidance for the ethical crises of modernity, in contrast
to what he regarded as the secularization of a Christian
“self-renunciation” that would falsely subordinate the
more positive or cohesive sense of self now needed.1 In
an interview from 1984 he stated:
From Antiquity [i.e., these post-Socratics] to
Christianity, we pass from a morality that was
essentially the search for a personal ethics to a
morality as obedience to a system of rules. And
if I was interested in Antiquity it was because...
the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of
rules is now disappearing...And to this absence...
must correspond the search for an “aesthetics of
experience.” (Foucault, 1984/1988a, p. 49)
And in a 1983 essay:
We have to promote new forms of subjectivity
through the refusal of this kind of individuality
that has been imposed on us for several centuries.
(Foucault, 1983b, p. 216)
Foucault’s late concentration on what he
understood as the spiritual practices of the Stoics,
Epicureans, and Cynics, as offering a potentially liberating
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spiritual guidance for the modern individual, was later
extended by another French philosopher, Pierre Hadot
(1922 - 2010), whom Foucault cited for support in his
own analyses. Hadot is best known for his re-valuation of
these post-Socratic philosophies as spiritual practices most
similar to key aspects of Eastern meditative traditions,
rather than primarily as conceptual systems. Hadot’s
phenomenologically based views concentrate on postSocratic techniques of cultivating a sense of numinous
presence or Being (What is Ancient Philosophy, The Inner
Citadel, The Present Alone is our Happiness). As will be
shown below, Foucault’s and Hadot’s “geneology” of postSocratic spiritual practices places them within Weber’s
(1922/1963) typology of religions as forms of the “inner”
or “this worldly” mysticism which both Weber and his
colleague Ernst Troeltsch (1931/1992) saw as the direction
of potential spiritual revival in the modern secularized
West, and of which much of current transpersonal
psychology is both example and its own analysis.2
Return to the Subject in Later Foucault
uch of Foucault’s early critique of the centrality
of the subject and consciousness was based on
his intense skepticism concerning the inclusive metatheories of an essential human nature appearing in
the new disciplines of late 19th and early 20th century
psychology, sociology, and anthropology (The Order of
Things, The Archeology of Knowledge). He saw these as
immanent naturalistic substitutes for the transcendent
overview of the boundaries and essence of the human
condition associated with the already secularizing
Judeo-Christian tradition—implicitly replacing the
God whose “death” had been proclaimed by Nietzsche.
These attempts at “social scientific” paraphrase must
ultimately fail for Foucault since they leave us entirely
“inside” our own being, with no quasi-external stance
from which to conceptually encompass our historical
contingency, particularity, and myriad variation.
Foucault’s prediction of the inevitable demise of these
original macro-theories in the human sciences seems
confirmed by their subsequent splintering, by the mid
1990s, into the current hyper-specializations of myriad
subdisciplines, based almost entirely on the more
“objectified” statistical methods equally appropriate to
the physical sciences. This seemingly inexorable shift
from the interpretive systems of early psychology and
sociology to a primacy of methodologies of measurement
and statistical probability can be taken as illustrating
Foucault on a contemporary “episteme” of objectification

M

Hunt

and accountability—extended from technologies of
economic production to the utilities of persons.
Along with this historical attenuation of
interpretive and phenomenological approaches, one
can see the present marginalization into a specialized
subdiscipline of the dimension of consciousness, including
its spiritual or transpersonal expression, which had been
foundational for the early more qualitative meta-theories
of the human sciences. Indeed it is striking to see the
centrality of explicit theories of religion and spirituality,
whether understood reductively or more constructively,
in the work of James, Fechner, Freud, Jung, and Baldwin
in psychology, and Durkheim, Weber, Tylor, Frazer, and
Levy-Bruehl in sociology and anthropology. Foucault’s
intuition of these traditions as already endangered “place
holders” for a secularizing religiosity is also confirmed
by the widespread appeal of early psychology and social
science to many of its pioneers as a way to seek some
resolution for their own personal crises of religious belief
—as the ideal place to attempt a reconciliation, one way
or the other, of the collisions of science and religion. It is
also striking how many of these early pioneering figures
either had fathers who were pastors or had themselves left
an initial ministerial training (Hunt, 2003; Taylor, 1999).
So it seems significant that Foucault’s return
to the subject is associated with his own attempt at a
geneology of Western spirituality in the context of what
he saw as contemporary ethical dilemmas of personhood
and personal cohesion. In his 1981-1982 lectures, The
Hermeneutics of the Subject, he suggested that the subject
or self is at least partly defined, in contrast to his earlier
cultural relativism, by an intrinsic “ontological freedom.”
This is always implied by our potential for “resistance
to power”—that the individual is never entirely
determined by the largely unconscious “structures” of
institutionalized knowledge and power. In a 1983 essay
he stated:
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and
only insofar as they are free,...faced with a field of
possibilities in which several ways of behaving may
be realized....Slavery is not a power relationship...it is
a question of a physical relationship of constraint....
The relationship between power and freedom’s
refusal to submit cannot therefore be separated.
(Foucault, 1983b, p. 221)
Foucault’s renewed interest in an intrinsic
dimension of the subject and subjectivity is associated
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with a more complex understanding, replacing his
earlier extreme cultural constructivism, in which the
singularities of experience arise from the continuous
interplay of three more or less universal dimensions,
endlessly intersecting and tumbling over each other, and
with no one considered primary or foundational. In his
1982-1983 lectures, The Government of Self and Others,
he defined these three co-dependent and co-defined axes
of experience as follows:
1) A dimension of “power”, with which his earlier
work was chiefly pre-occupied, now defined in terms
of practices or “technologies” of “governance” and
normativity
2) A dimension of “knowledge,” defined in terms of
cultural technologies of truth “veridication”
3) The dimension of the subject, defined in terms of
“technologies of self transformation” that elicit different
“modes of being,” and which are most developed in any
society in its spiritual practices and traditions.
With respect to these latter he stated, in a late interview:
I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign,
founding subject, a universal form of subject to
be found everywhere...I believe, on the contrary,
that the subject is constituted through practices of
subjection, or in a more autonomous way, through
practices of liberation...as in Antiquity, on the basis
of course, of a number of rules, styles, inventions
to be found in the cultural environment. (Foucault,
1984/1988a, p. 50)
While the techniques of an ultimately spiritual self
transformation are culturally provided, their degree
of pursuit or resistence always involves for Foucault
a component of personal choice and ability. In terms
of recent research we might speak of an individual
difference dimension of “imaginative absorption” or
“openness to experience” as leading into a spontaneous
fascination with the spiritual and transpersonal (Hunt,
2000, 2003).
Foucault on Spiritual Practices,
Spiritual Knowledge, and Bataille on Ecstasy
oucault stressed that while different spiritual
traditions can reflect very different cultural values,
their techniques overlap strikingly:

F

There is in all societies...another type of techniques;
of operations on their own bodies, on their own
souls...so as to transform themselves...to attain a
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certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity,
of supernatural power, and so on. Let’s call this kind
of techniques a technology of the self. (Foucault,
1980/1999, p. 162)
These techniques included purification and purgation,
the use of oracle and dream interpretation, isolation,
breath control, the contemplation of death, and
meditative concentration. In the Western tradition he
located some of these practices in Socrates, the earlier
Pythagoreans, and expresses interest in views that they
would extend back into shamanism.
Spiritual practices are defined as producing
a “spiritual knowledge” that changes one’s “mode of
being” or “subjective being”:
Spirituality...postulates that for the subject to
have right access to the truth he must be changed,
transformed...and become to some extent, and up to
a certain point, other than himself....[by] something
that...fulfills or transfigures his very being. (Foucault,
1981-1982, pp. 15-16)
Accordingly, Foucault distinguished the “spiritual
knowledge” that transforms one’s “mode of being” from
the now broader intellectual and scientific knowledge
whose full understanding does not involve or require
such inner transformation.
He separated earlier
Western spiritual traditions, where all forms of truth
had spiritual implications, from what he terms the
“Cartesian moment” of the modern scientific era, where
science and religion become increasingly independent.
Here Foucault is reminiscent of both Max Weber
(1922/63) and Jung (1938/1958a) on their differentiation
of religious or sacred eras, where spiritual knowledge is
central to the larger culture, as in medieval Christianity,
the early Renaissance, and the post-Socratics, from more
secularized eras. In the “disenchantment” of modernity
spiritual knowledge becomes its own separate enclave,
and the individual no longer feels “at home” in a
universe in which a larger macrocosmic and “objective”
knowledge bears no relation to the “merely” subjective
human microcosm (see also Hunt, 2011; Tarnas, 2006).
In this regard it is worth considering
contemporary transpersonal psychology itself as another
version of this modern separation that Foucault is
addressing. It begins with William James’ Varieties of
Religious Experience and his suggestion of a mystical
or numinous core to the world religions, which James,
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and later Jung, understood as a “natural” function that
confers a sense of higher or superordinate meaning and
purpose in human existence. Yet James and Jung both
realized that while such “higher states of consciousness”
can be studied in terms of their phenomenology and
empirical effects on peoples’ lives, they can in themselves
offer no “proof” of their conceptual content, which
remains persistently outside what Foucault would term
the larger “episteme” of contemporary science. While this
is especially obvious in the recently popular “scientific”
refutations of contemporary evangelical religiosity, it is
also true of some more “new age” mystical spiritualities,
which do attempt some degree of integration with
quantum and cosmological physics (Hunt, 2001, 2006).
While significant for an innovative heterodoxy in both
psychology and physics, these attempts remain either
unknown or anathema to most mainstream academics
in university departments of physics, chemistry, and
biology.
Foucault’s discussion of this modern separation
of spiritual knowledge from the larger secular culture
helps in retrospect to understand both his own earlier
appreciation and ambivalence concerning the writings
of the French philosopher Georges Bataille (1954/1988;
1967/1989) on ecstasy, as expressed in Foucault’s 1963
essay, “A preface to transgression.” Bataille anticipated
important aspects of contemporary transpersonal
psychology. In his expressionist, at times surreal, book
Inner Experience he understood ecstasy, or what Otto
(1917/1958) termed numinous experience, in postNietzschean terms as a natural and human capacity
that becomes automatically “transgressive” in both a
cultural and personal sense in a secular age.3 Bataille’s
definition of ecstasy includes the great religious mystics,
although he argued that any interpretation in terms of
a supernatural God distorts its more human nature.
Accordingly, his definition is broadened to include
erotic bliss, intense laughter, dance, ritual violence, and
all manner of intoxications. Ecstasy for Bataille is the
experience of Being within the unfolding moment, as
a state of inner sovereignty, freedom, and potential for
pure intimacy. For Foucault, Bataille’s ecstasies are very
real “limit experiences” of the discursively “impossible.”
Foucault’s own ambivalence here appears in his statement
that while such felt sovereignties “...must be recognized
some day and we must try to assimilate them” (Foucault,
1963/1977, p. 38-39), yet such intense ecstasy is like a
brilliant flash of lightning on a dark night—in that
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the darkness of the night is actually intensified in its
wake. The brief illuminations and felt significances of
spontaneous and psychedelic drug induced ecstasy in
the modern setting, for Foucault, actually intensify a
subsequent “night of nothingness,” as a black despair
and sensed futility. In hindsight they can seem like
“mere” subjectivities lost within an era of pervasive
“objectification.”
Not only can one see something of this negative
aftermath in the reactive despair of what has been
popularly termed “suicide Tuesday” in the wake of
weekend long, rave overuse of the drug Ecstasy, but also
in a late interview where Foucault discussed his feelings
of the importance, yet personal ambivalence, of his own
drug explorations:
I think that the kind of pleasure I would consider
as the real pleasure would be so deep, so intense,
so overwhelming that I couldn’t survive it. I would
die....There is also the fact that some drugs are really
important for me because they are the mediation to
these incredibly intense joys...that I am not able to
experience, to afford by myself...the complete total
pleasure and, for me, it’s related to death. (Foucault,
1983/1988b, p. 12)
While this is not to judge Foucault himself or
any serious explorer of psychedelic substances, perhaps
nothing better underlines the negative side of Foucault’s
separation of ecstatic experience from the contemporary
larger culture than much of contemporary recreational
drug use or over-use. If, as Rudolf Otto maintained,
numinous states of awe, fascination, and bliss are always
schematized or interpreted as part of the very fabric
of their experience, as most obviously seen within the
cultural variations across the world mysticisms (Katz,
1978; Hunt, 2012), then the contemporary societal
segregation and rejection of drug experiences will risk
their actual schematization by, and reinforcement
of, the larger context of personal alienation, social
disengagement, and sensed futility that their usage
actually seeks to overcome, or at least compensate. It
may be this dilemma that Foucault was locating in the
experiences of Bataille, and partly describing in his own
life.
If, with Martin Jay (2005), we apply Foucault’s
later understanding of experience as an emergent
constellation of only partially separable dimensions
of knowledge, normativity, and subjectification to
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Bataille’s ecstatic “limit-experiences,” it seems clear that
“experience” is no longer something entirely derivative
and epi-phenomenal. While it arises out of a multitude
of dimensions, these now include the “forms of
subjectivity” central to Bataille. Experience for the later
Foucault is both a resultant and a potentially separable
component of that resultant. Following Jay (2005),
“experience” in Foucault’s sense of the immediately
undergone limit situations of death, sexuality, crime,
madness, and mysticism is best approximated by the
German word erlebnis. This refers to an immediately
undergone, pre-reflective “state of consciousness.”
Meanwhile, “experience” in the sense of an emergent,
derivative constellation of dimensions, which will
include and transform erlebnis, is best represented by the
word erfahrung—as experience in the sense of a more
temporally extended, relationally unfolding “event.”
Where experience predominates as resultant
constellation it includes Foucault’s subjectification
processes of self-identity. This is the sense of self
specifically disrupted and suspended by the ecstatic
experiences of maximum intensity central to Bataille.
For Bataille and Foucault these experiences are also open
to both intimate sharing and varying degrees of cultural
appropriation. In his own life Foucault sought out such
limit-experiences in the homoerotic sexual adventuring
that led to his death from AIDS, and in the drug
experiences to which he alludes.
Foucault and Hadot
on the Contemporary Relevance
of Post-Socratic Spiritualities
iven the later Foucault’s concern with a
contemporary cultural segregation of new forms of
spiritual experience, it is of particular interest that he came
to see the post-Socratic practices of self transformation,
while no longer open to simple imitation or revival, as
nonetheless offering a potential spiritual guidance for
the present. Specifically, these traditions would point
toward a larger ethical renewal for the more positive and
cohesive sense of self needed to deal with the complexities
of institutionalized power within contemporary society.
Here it is illuminating to compare Foucault on these
“care of the self” or “aesthetics of existence” traditions
to Pierre Hadot’s later development of the same material,
since they both refer to each other—with Foucault
citing the earlier essays of Hadot for initial support
and justification. Both came to see these philosophical
movements as spiritual practices and disciplines in their
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own right, rather than more traditionally as primarily
conceptual systems. Where Hadot will concentrate
on the Hellenistic Stoic, Epicurean, and neo-Platonist
cultivations of an experience of inner presence or Being,
Foucault focuses more on the Roman era of Stoic,
Epicurean, and Cynic experience of inner autonomy,
freedom, and social responsibility.
The Later Foucault
In his 1981-1982 lectures, The Hemeneutics of
the Subject, Foucault contrasted the positive sense of
spiritual self development in the post-Socratics with
what he saw as the later Christian emphasis on self
renunciation, sinfulness, and the personal confession of
intensely private matters to an external authority. Both
in these lectures and in his final posthumous books, The
Use of Pleasure (1985), and The Care of the Self (1986), he
also contrasted the Stoic teacher as spiritual guide and
guru, with the medieval Christian confessor as examiner
and moral judge. Where the post-Socratics viewed
sexuality as primarily a matter of personal hygiene and
mental balance, about which one can make “mistakes”
that can be corrected or “mastered” through meditative
discipline, the traditional Christian view was of sex as
“original sin,” revelatory of hidden moral limitations that
require unlimited interrogation and decipherment. It is
the later secularization of this distrust and renunciation
of self that Foucault finds so dangerous in the modern
setting.
Indeed it does seem that systematic distrust of
the individual, and a self-justifying obsession with one’s
“accountability,” has become an underlying implication
of modern institutional life. Foucault questioned this
normative acceptance of continuous scrutiny and
accountability, whether self-administered, institutional,
or scientifically based. He also saw this reflected in
the very Western contemporary preoccupation, indeed
obsession, with the new “science” of sexuality. Foucault
(1978a) questioned whether such preoccupation could
ever be part of any genuine sexual liberation. For the
Greeks and Romans sexuality and gender could never be
the inner essence of one’s essential soul or personhood,
and in this Foucault seems to have found support for
neither hiding nor making a personal politics of his own
homosexuality (Carrette, 1999).
It is of interest that Foucault’s turn from a
secularized Christian self renunciation to the positive
spiritual self of the Stoics comes in the same decades that
saw an analogous shift in psychoanalytically oriented
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psychotherapies from the decipherment of hidden and
unconscious motivations to a more predominant concern
with the cohesion of sense of self (Kohut) and an inner
sense of presence, being, and feeling real (Winnicott and
Bion), both highly congruent with Maslow’s (1962) self
actualization and its inner sense of realized identity as
Being (see also Hunt, 2003).
Both Foucault and Hadot begin their
interpretation of this alternative Western spirituality
with Socrates, but to somewhat different effect.
Foucault’s Socrates is fundamentally concerned with the
“governance” or “care” of self, which must be developed
first before it can be naturally and spontaneously
extended to help others. Foucault agreed that the proper
care of oneself is ontologically and ethically prior. Here
he is on Socrates in a late interview:
He would greet people in the street...with the
question: Are you caring for yourself? For he has
been entrusted with this mission by a god and he
will not abandon it even when threatened with
death. He is the man who cares abut the care of
others. (Foucault, 1984/1997, p. 287)
Foucault (1981-1982) emphasized that the
methods of self transformation one finds in common to
Socrates himself and the later Stoics, Epicureans, and
Cynics, including meditative concentration, periodic
social withdrawal, and the contemplation of death,
should be considered primarily as spiritual techniques.
He cited in this regard the terms they used for these
techniques of inner transformation, such as “inward
conversion,” “reversion to the self,” “inner awakening,”
and askesis, the latter in the sense of Weber on the “ascetic
practices” that Foucault speculated can be traced back
into shamanism.
While regarding the post-Socratic spiritualities
as potential guidance for the present, at the same
time Foucault is not uncritical of these traditions. He
separated their more spiritual level, cultivating the inner
daimon or “Zeus within,” from a more popular “art of
living” level of the later Roman era, associated with
the more inward attitude needed as civic involvements
became more dangerous, and which in Weber’s terms
would constitute a later secularization of the postSocratic spiritualities. From a present perspective,
Foucault (1984/1988c, 1986) saw these latter as risking
a narrow “elitism,” while the more popular forms could
fall into a kind of “dandyism” and narcissism. He
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especially admired the later Cynics for their capacity of
“truth telling” in the face of power.
Yet all forms and levels of these traditions show a
this-worldly valuation of personhood, individuality, and
equality of soul that has traditionally been associated
only with a Judeo-Christian heritage, and regarded as
crucial to Western values. In The Care of the Self Foucault
quoted from the Roman philosopher Seneca on the Stoic
understanding of the soul:

What is striking here from the perspective of Foucault’s
concern with the modern segregation of “spiritual
knowledge” is that the positive, emergent sense of self
and techniques of self transformation common to these
Hellenistic-Roman traditions are entirely congruent
with the larger secular culture of today, and this perhaps
in contrast to some “New Age” interests in Eastern
and/or Gnostic mysticisms. Thus their potential for
a contemporary guidance toward a this-worldly “reenchantment.”
With respect to the cosmologies of the Stoics
and Epicureans, it is worth noting that their very
different understandings of physical cosmos also
resonate with some aspects, albeit often heterodox, of
modern physical theory (Hunt, 1995, 2001). There is
some consistency between Stoic physics, where the world
is held together by a living force “moving of itself ” and
causing things to “spring up” (Diogenes Laertius, vol. 2,
p. 253), and current interests in dynamic self organizing
systems in physical nature. Similarly, recent linkages
between quantum micro-physics and consciousness,
actually put forward by Neils Bohr (1934), are already
present in the Democritean connection between the
chance combinations of atomic particles and the inner
spontaneity of experience, which was central to the
materialism of Epicurus. Conceptually at least, much
of the super-structure of Western physical theory can
trace its geneaology back into Greek and Hellenistic
science, which was fully coordinated with post-Socratic
spiritual practices. What potential this may offer for the
re-integration of a separated spiritual knowledge within
Western mainstream culture remains to be seen. It is not

yet clear whether the sociological hyper-differentiation
foreseen by Weber will leave self-organizing complexity
theories and quantum consciousness as their own
segregated heterodox enclaves, along with any respective
integrations with New Age spiritualities, or whether the
larger renaissance Foucault found lacking could still
prove possible.
Finally, on the more strictly philosophic side of
Foucault’s later thought, his concentration on spiritual
self-transformation of an inner “mode of being” does seem
to have at least tacitly re-introduced a phenomenological
orientation to consciounsess, certainly not in the sense of
Husserl’s universal foundation of meaning, but perhaps
more in the sense of Heidegger’s (1927/1962) analysis of
an implicit structure of Dasein. If experience is finally
understood by Foucault as the continuous intersection
and cross-determination of the three dimensions of
power, knowledge, and the subject, and the first two
have their own complex determining structures, then
by implication, Heidegger, who Foucault (1984/1988c)
cited, after Nietzsche, as the major influence on his
development, is describing “states of Being” that have
their own implicit structure. For Heidegger this appears
as the sense of care or concern as we face toward the
continuous “carry forward” of time into a permanent
“horizonal openness.” The early and later Heidegger
understood this “being experience” as implicit in an
everyday life “temporalizing” as specific life situations,
but it is the felt sense of Being as such that would
be exteriorized in the “intensifying concentration”
(Heidegger, 1919/2013) of mystical experience—as
the full “reflectance” of our “self-aware existence”
(Heidegger, 1919/2008).
In Foucaultian terms one could speculate
that such spiritual states represent experience where
the dimension of subject relatively predominates in
its determinations over the dimensions of power and
knowledge. These latter will more commonly constrain
and direct that “flow of experience” in the way that
water, which also has its own patterns, can take the
shape of what contains it. Certainly it is the latter
that Foucault saw as predominating in contemporary
cultural structures of “normativity” and accountability.
It is of interest then that Foucault’s (1954/1993) first
published paper was a loosely phenomenological
analysis of Binswanger’s Heideggerian understanding
of the inner freedom of dreaming. There dreaming, as
spontaneous response to cultural and personal history,
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What else should you call such a soul than a god
dwelling as a guest in a human body? A soul like this
may descend into a Roman knight just as well as into
a freedman’s son or a slave....They are mere titles....
One may leap to heaven from a slum. (Foucault,
1986, p. 86)
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is also never entirely reducible to it. Foucault’s final
centering on the dimension of subject and “states of
Being” seems a partial return to a modified existentialphenomenology that also becomes central for Hadot
(2006, 2011).
Hadot on a Post-Socratic This-Worldly Mysticism
Hadot also begins with Socrates, but less with
the self-governance of Foucault, than the guidance of an
inner daimon, and the courage and detachment it allows
in the face of social pressure, legal prosecution, and
imminent death (Hadot, 2002). For Hadot each postSocratic school seeks the imitation and formulation of
key characteristics of the person of Socrates, very much in
the way early directions of Christianity where inspired by
differing aspects within the charismatic impact of Jesus.
Thus the Skeptics imitated Socrates’ aporetic capacity
for acknowledging the “not knowing” of what cannot
be truly or finally known—what Keats later termed
“negative capability.” The Cynics, Foucault’s main focus
in his last lecture series during 1983-1984 and recently
published as The Courage of Truth (2011), emulated the
public guidance offered by Socrates, his concern for the
ethical welfare of others. The Epicureans concentrated
on the Socratic eudaimon, or inner peace and tranquility.
For them the pleasure of Being itself is the most subtle
bliss possible for human beings, on the same level as the
detached, contemplative gods. So all cruder pleasures of
body and emotion must be minimized and mastered,
much as with the Stoics, so that this experience of Being
can arise and predominate. Finally, the Stoics sought
principally the Socratic ataraxia—that capacity for
inner autonomy and detachment they termed the “Zeus
within.” Its development would allow the discrimination
of what was within one’s control and what was not,
with the acceptance of the latter as a manifestation
of the Divine Will to which one must align and daily
surrender. This continuous meditative openness to events
as spontaneous manifestation of the divine was the core
of Stoic practice (Epictetus, 2nd century).
All these traditions emphasized the same
detachment in the face of persecution and death, and
Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers
(3rd century) recounted individual tales of courageous
martyrdom reminiscent of the early Christians.
Hadot (1998, 2002) is struck by the way in which
differing conceptual systems among these post-Socratic
traditions were associated with the same spiritual
practices, suggesting that they reflect essentially the
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same movement, one inspired by the lived example and
inspiration of Socrates—in contrast to the more purely
metaphysical systems of the later Plato and Aristotle.
Instead, these were primarily spiritual practices, centering
on a meditative concentration on the experience of Being
or presence in the moment, more reminiscent in terms of
technique with the meditative traditions of Taoism and
Sufism (Izutsu, 1984), rather than what is traditionally
termed “philosophy.”
For Hadot there is a common capacity for a
“cosmic consciousness” that is shared across the later
Stoics, Epicureans, and more obviously mystical neoPlatonists such as Plotinus (Hadot, 1993), conferring
a sense of being “at home” in the universe as then
understood by Hellenistic science. Here is Hadot on this
experience of Being or presence:
The Stoics and Epicureans invite us...to live in the
only moment in which we live, that is the present...
as though we only had this day, only this moment,
to live....as though we were seeing the world for the
first and for the last time...The recognition of this...
sacred character of life and of existence will lead us
to understand our responsibility toward others and
toward ourselves. (Hadot, 2011, p. 166, 189)
For Heidegger (1938/1994), and it would appear for
Hadot as well, this experience of Being is at the core of
Otto’s sense of the numinous awe, wonder, and bliss of the
mystical states more or less common to the world religions.
This would be the place then to locate these
post-Socratic spiritualities both in terms of Max Weber’s
(1922/1963) extensive typology of world religions and the
approximate coordination of the latter with variations
within characteristic forms of transpersonal or numinous
experience (Hunt, 2003). Weber distinguished between
more mystical-experiential and prophetical-ethical
orientations, and within each of these between more thisor inner-worldly and other-worldly attitudes. In innerworldly spirituality one’s realization/salvation is based
on practice within everyday social living, rather than the
retreat into more isolated communities or monasteries.
The post-Socratic spiritual traditions, with their
emphasis on an aesthetics of existence and cultivation
of presence within the everyday social order would be
examples of Weber’s this-worldly mystical orientation,
in contrast to the “world rejecting” mysticisms of neoPlatonism, Medieval Christian monasticism, and Eastern
Buddhism and Vedanta, and further contrasted with the
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this-worldly ethical propheticism of traditional Judaism,
Pauline Christianity, and the Protestant Reformation
and its Puritan sects.
To stay with the contrastive forms of more
mystical-ecstatic states, Laski (1961) distinguished two
directions of development in the felt transformations
of personal identity or sense of self. On the one hand,
there is the dissolution of self into an all-one Absolute,
as in Plotinus and much of the other-worldly Eastern
mysticisms. On the other, there is the felt enhancement/
transformation of self that one finds in the Stoics and
Epicureans. The psychology of this dimension of identity
transformation is reflected in Jung’s (1959) concept of
the Self, which he considered most fully realized in the
persons of Jesus and Buddha. It is also central to Maslow’s
(1962) description of the peak or numinous experiences
of self actualization, where one’s sense of identity
becomes Being itself – “I am” experiences that evoke felt
autonomy, love for others, and joy.
Almaas (1988) has subsequently distinguished
two overlapping forms within this sensed expansion of
self. First there is what he has termed “personal essence,”
as the spontaneous synthesis of an authentic autonomy
with empathic sensitivity and care for others, which
one finds in Socrates himself, Stoic teachings, and
Cynic practices. Second, there is what Almaas termed
experiences of one’s “essential identity” as Being, which
is most explicitly developed in the Epicureans. While
inner-worldly mysticism, with its positive transformation
in self identity, is found especially developed in aspects of
Taoism and Sufism (see Izutsu, 1984), its most traditional
Western form is actually to be found in the postSocratics. Its more contemporary New Age expression
appeared in the Gurdjieff-Ouspensky movement, not
in its more other-worldly neo-gnostic metaphysics, but
in the Sufi influenced technique of “self remembering.”
This is a kind of extraverted meditative practice, in the
midst of everyday social life, cultivating and sustaining
an immediate sense of presence or existence. Its
successful practice, while especially difficult in the midst
of social involvements in which we normally “lose”
ourselves, sounds very much like the sense of clarity,
freeing detachment, and expansive joy of Maslow’s “peak
experiences” of Being (Ouspensky, 1959; DeVilaineCambessedes, 1997). Gurdjieff groups practice this
cultivation of ongoing presence with each other in much
the way practiced within the Epicurean “gardens,” the
retreat areas to be found in every major city during
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the Hellenistic era—a dispersion which Gurdjieff, and
contemporary Almaas Diamond-Heart groups, hoped to
emulate in the modern West (Hunt, 2003).4
Both Weber (1922/1963) and his associate
Ernst Troeltsch (1931/1992) can be seen as anticipating
for the later 20th century an inner- or this-worldly
mystical direction of spiritual renewal among the
educated middle classes, one more than borne out by the
psychedelic and New Age mystical movements of the
1960s, as the predominant response to a contemporary
secularization, disenchantment, and loss of JudeoChristian religious belief. It follows from Weber and
Troeltsch that any genuine re-newal, apart from the
reactive fundamentalisms of more traditional groups,
would need to be mystical, in order to compensate for the
exhaustion of an earlier and predominant propheticalethical religious tradition. Meanwhile, the form of such a
re-newal would need to be predominantly “this-worldly”
to be consistent with and appeal to our historically
unprecedented materialism and individualism—
itself for Weber the secularized embodiment of the
this-worldly Christian values of “on earth as it is in
heaven.” Developing their analyses largely independent
of the sociologies of Weber and Troeltsch, and outside
transpersonal and New Age circles, it seems strikingly
prescient that Foucault and Hadot would arrive at
the post-Socratic Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics, the
major Western traditions of a this-worldly mysticism,
as offering the major guidance for any contemporary
spiritual renewal that might re-balance an ethics of the
modern subject in a society that they see, with Weber,
as over-rationalizing, technologizing, and objectifying
both individual and natural world.
Similarities of Post-Socratic Spirituality
to Earliest Christianity
espite Foucault’s emphasis on a post-Socratic
“aesthetics of existence” as an alternative to
Christian self-renunciation, and what he considered
the dangers today in our largely unconscious
secularization of the latter, there are partial parallels
between these two “this worldly” movements, and
especially so when one considers the very earliest form
of Christianity still linked to the historical Jesus. These
parallels emerge from the analyses of both Foucault
and Hadot, explicitly for Foucault in his treatment of
the Roman Cynics, and more implicitly in the strong
implication of Hadot’s phenomenology of post-Socratic
presence or Being experiences in early gospel accounts.
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The Christianity Foucault rejected in terms of its
contemporary secularization is based on the post-5th
century emergence of the confessional and what he saw
as its subsequent emphasis on inquisitional interrogation
and self-distrust of all privacy and inwardness. Other
than his analysis of the Cynics in his final lectures,
one does not know what else he might have made of
the very earliest Christian era, since the draft of his
book on Christianity, which he hoped to modify based
on his final lectures, was held back from publication
(Carrette, 1999; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).
Foucault and the Cynics
Foucault, in his final lectures on The Courage
of Truth (2011), along with the historian of Jesus, John
Crossan (1994), was struck by the parallels between the
Roman era Cynics, in particular, and the early Christian
Apostles, as well as with later Christian mendicant
orders, such as the early Franciscans and more heretical
Waldensians. Both the Cynics and Christian Apostles
were committed to the ethical and spiritual guidance
of others. Both followed a path of homeless wondering,
foregoing family, marriage, and children, and returning
a persistent care and love for others in response to any
resulting abuse. In Crossan’s terms, “Both are life-style
preachers, advocating their position not only by word but
by deed, not only in theory but in practice” (Crossan,
Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography, 1994, p. 137). Crossan
concluded that the early followers of Jesus would have
been initially understood at the time as populist Cynics.
As inner/this worldly spiritual practices, one more
mystical, the other prophetical, both seek the social
transformation of everyday life.
Foucault was also struck by significant
differences, with implications for a present guidance,
centered ultimately around the “free spokenness”
(parrhēsia) of the Cynics in “speaking truth to
power.” The Cynic goes forth alone, emphasizing a
fierce self sufficiency and autonomy, the Apostles in
small communal groups. He begs for food, while they
exchange a communal reciprocity of hands-on healing
for shelter and meals. The key difference for Foucault
is in the positive sense of self in the Cynic: The Cynic
is a
universal missionary of mankind, who watches over
men whatever they may be doing...which people
quarrel among themselves, which household enjoys
peace....All this is the Cynic’s mission, which is
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nothing other than the reverse, positive side of his
detachment. (Foucault, 1983-1984, p. 301)
This emphasis on autonomy and aggressive ethical
challenge sounds very different than Christian Agape.
Accordingly the Cynic turns the other cheek
in response to inevitable abuse from freely confronting
the ethics of others, not out of humility and selfrenunciation but out of a kind of inner pride, presence,
and freedom. Following here Foucault’s own reliance on
Epictetus (2nd century), Cynics, who are understood as
civically committed Stoics, aim to evoke their own sense
of presence, detachment, and inner sovereignty (the
Zeus within) in others. They reflect a kind of extraverted
Stoicism, in contrast to what Epictetus (vol. 2) regarded
as the “madness” of the Galileans (p. 363). Indeed, one
would never confuse Diogenes telling Alexander the
Great to stand out of his sunlight with the early Apostles
evocation of universal forgiveness and love. The overt
provocations of the Cynics are actually more reminiscent
of the Sufi “way of blame,” later adopted in the behavior
of Gurdjieff, where unconventional and even outrageous
behavior is used as a form of teaching that tests and
challenges (Bennett, 1973; Toussulis, 2010).
One can infer that it would be such challenges
to “normativity” and institutional empowerments that
Foucault himself would find more suited to the present
than a humility of self surrender and renunciation—
whether that negation of self is Christian or takes the
very different form of meditative Buddhism, which he
also questioned in this regard (Foucault, 1978b).
Presence/Being Experience
in Early Gospel Accounts
The experience of immediate here and now
presence, with its felt qualities of freedom, joy, and
timeless eternity, which Hadot saw as the explicit focus
of post-Socratic spiritual practices, is also strongly
implied within the earliest gospel accounts of the precrucifixion teaching of Jesus, while largely occluded
under the later future oriented narrative schematizations
of Resurrection and Apocalypse. This would be the
implicit “mystical element” at the core of prophetical as
well as mystical religion for Troeltsch (1931/1992). It is
interesting that Gurdjieff, who on occasion referred to
his “fourth way” movement as an “esoteric Christianity,”
said that it is impossible to sustain the Christian ideal
of love and forgiveness, other than through an effortful
and often failing struggle, without the lost capacity for
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the spontaneously empowering experience of Being still
inferrable in earliest Christianity.
Such as we are we cannot be Christians....Christ says
“love your enemies,” but we cannot even love our
friends...In order to be a good Christian one must
first be....(as quoted in Ouspensky, 1949, p. 102)
First one must be able [to be], only then can one love.
Unfortunately, with time, modern Christians have
adopted the second half, to love, and lost view of
the first, the religion which should have preceded it.
(Gurdjieff, 1973, p. 153).
If one then asks what would stop or inhibit this
experience of ongoing presence, both Hadot’s account of
the Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, along with the
Gurdjieff/Almaas tradition, will answer 1) preoccupation
with the past and its sensed guilt, shame, and regret, 2)
anxieties, fantasizing, and fearful preoccupations about the
future. Both take the practitioner equally and powerfully
away from any capacity to stay in the unfolding moment of
Being. Yet what does Jesus, as pre-crucifixion charismatic
teacher, moving and inspiring large crowds of followers,
teach? 1) All past sins are forgiven – as a universal
dispensation depending only on its acceptance and
extension to a corresponding forgiveness for others 2) The
eternal kingdom of heaven is already here. The future and
death as personal annihilation is no longer to be feared:
Anyone who...puts his trust in Him who sent me
has hold of eternal life, and does not come up for
judgement, but has already passed from death to
life....He shall never know what it is to die....No one
who is alive and has faith shall ever die. (John 5: -24,
8:-51, 11:-26)
To fully feel these teachings from the speech and example
of Jesus would be to experience a numinous sense of
timeless and eternal Being, joy, and gratitude (see also
Hunt, 2012).
Probably the first person to fully articulate this
“mystical element” embedded within gospel narratives
was Nietzsche, himself steeped in accounts of the Stoics,
Epicureans, and Cynics from his studies of Diogenes
Laertius, and a major intellectual influence on Foucault:
Here is Nietzsche in The Anti-Christ:
In the whole psychology of the “evangel” the concept
of guilt and punishment is lacking....”Sin”—any
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distance separating God and man—is abolished:
precisely this is the “glad tidings.” Blessedness is not
promised...it is the only reality....[It is] how one
must live, in order to feel oneself “in heaven,” to
feel “eternal”...a new way of life, not a new faith....
The “kingdom of heaven” is a state of the heart—
not something that is to come “above the earth” or
“after death”....Not a faith...[but] another state of
being...It is plain what was finished with the death
on the cross: a new, an entirely original basis for
a Buddhistic peace movement, for an actual, not
merely promised, happiness on earth. (Nietzsche,
1888/1954b, pp. 606, 7, 8, 13, 16)
For Nietzsche, as more recently for Crossan
(1994), the later schematization and “raising” of the
death by ignominious crucifixion into the future
oriented doctrines of Resurrection, Ascension, and
Return in Judgement will have occluded this more
spontaneous experience of numinous presence and
its felt eternity. Bataille (1954, 1967) had originated
his own phenomenology of numinous experience
as a natural human capacity based on Nietzsche’s
accounts of his own personal experiences of ecstasy
(see also Hunt, 2003). This is what Nietzsche was
also locating, with Hadot, in the Stoic-Epicurean
experience of presence, as well as here in the earliest
gospel accounts. It could not be more different than
the later self-renunciation, life-long inner sinfulness,
and eternally postponed salvation that Foucault
finds so questionable in the context of its modern
secularization.
Conclusions
Foucaultian
The later Foucault and Hadot find in these postSocratic spiritualities less an occasion for any would-be
direct imitation or revival, than a guidance for a needed
renewal and re-balancing of an “ethics” of the modern
subject in a society whose institutions and forms of
knowledge systematically over-rationalize and dominate
the life of the individual:
one of the great problems of Western culture has been
to find the possibility of founding the hermeneutics
of the self, not as was the case in Christianity, on
the sacrifice of the self, but, on the contrary, on a
positive, on the theoretical and practical, emergence
of the self. (Foucault, 1980/1999, p. 180)
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If, as Foucault suggested, the sense of self is
largely determined by cultural “technologies of self
transformation” that are most developed in spiritual
traditions and practices, then “...maybe the problem
is to change these technologies” as part of a needed
“politics of ourselves” (Foucault, 1980/1999, p. 180).
If so, the “positive self” of the post-Socrates—with its
inner freedom, sovereignty, and presence—may be the
better guide to a “new ethics” more fully congruent
with the emerging culture at large than our powerfully
secularized version of self-distrust and an institutional
dominance over the sense of personhood and personal
presence on which our version of modern civilization has
been based.
Non Foucaultian
If Weber and Troeltsch are right that any
genuine spiritual renewal, in the midst of a modern
secularization/disenchantment of the Judeo-Christian
ethical-prophetical tradition, must come from a more
mystical-experiential direction;
And if it also follows that our unprecedented
development of a cultural materialism, utilitarianism,
and egocentric individualism can only be fully addressed
and reconciled by a mysticism that is, in Weber’s terms,
this- or inner-worldly;
And finally, if Jung (1943/1958b) has at least
some point, however contentious within current
transpersonal and New Age circles so often drawn to
Buddhism and Vedanta, on the problematic basis for
many in the modern West in seeking the full adoption
of spiritual traditions entirely outside one’s own culture
and upbringing;
Then, in looking for a geneaology of a thisworldly mysticism within our own cultural traditions of
the West, one will arrive, courtesy of the later Foucault
and the subsequent work of Hadot, at the post-Socratic
spiritual practices of “care of the soul” and its social
responsibilities of the Hellenistic-Roman era.
These traditions both by-pass the more otherworldly New Age appeals of the East and Gnostic
neo-Platonism, often seen as sanctioning a withdrawal
from the dilemmas of contemporary society, and avoid
the reactive prophetical fundamentalisms—Christian,
Jewish, or Islamic—that from a Foucaultian perspective
play back into our present society of totalizing
accountability and subordination of the person. Instead,
it would be guidance from the post-Socratic, especially
Stoic and Epicurean, spiritualities of an emergent self
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of felt presence, that might help address the cul de sac
of a world view, so forcefully critiqued by Foucault,
of a pervasive institutionally driven normativity and
accountability.
Foucault on Experience and its Implications
for the Transpersonal
Foucault’s later understanding of experience as
neither entirely derivative nor entirely constitutive, but
always a culturally and historically varying interactive
constellation, fits well with Scheler’s (1923/1960) and
Buber’s (1957) further amending of Otto’s univerality
of the numinous in terms of its necessary interaction
with discursive structures of culture and sectarian
“schematizations.” Mystical states, while showing the
cross cultural component also implied by Foucault’s
“technologies” of spiritual practices, will always entail
shifting degrees of that interaction (Hunt, 2006,
2012). With Ferrer (2002), the resulting performative
and ethical implications of transpersonal states avoid
the sometimes overstated extremes of both “perennial
philosophy” and a pure cultural constructivism.
From a later Foucaultian perspective one
could suggest that mystical experience, like all human
experience, is the resultant of multiple interacting
dimensions. It is an expressive constellation, within which
there are the core features of numinous states that do
tend to predominate within the overlapping mysticisms
of the major world religions. At the same time, mystical
states are open to a continuous and variable shaping
by societal, cultural-historical, cognitive, and personal
patterns. The later Foucault’s location of specific valuative
orientations, with a selective relevance and guidance for
the contemporary West, in the shaping of more or less
cross cultural “technologies of self transformation” in
the this-worldly spiritual schools of the post-Socratics
offers its own support for such an interactive approach
within transpersonal studies.
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Notes
1. We can be reasonably certain that Foucault’s last
three lecture series on post-Socratic practices of self
transformation would point the direction of any
subsequent book length studies had he lived longer,
given that his lectures generally anticipated his later
books by several years and the majority of The Use
of Pleasure (1985) and the posthumous The Care of
the Self (1986) were based on lectures immediately
preceding these final series.
2. Hadot’s concentration on the Stoics and Epicureans,
as part of a this-worldly spirituality inspired by the
person of Socrates, came only after his first published
work on the more other-worldly mysticism of
Plotinus (Hadot, 1993, first French edition 1963),
which he gradually concluded was irrelevant to
what is most significant in ordinary living (Hadot,
2011). It was the beginnings of this shift, and the
similar work of Hadot’s wife, Ilsetraut Hadot, that
Foucault cited as supporting his own approach in
the Hermeneutics of the Self lectures.
3. Both Foucault and Bataille were strongly influenced
by Nietzsche, but Foucault’s Nietzsche is centered
on the geneaological unmasking of cultural forms,
as in Beyond Good and Evil (1886/1954a), whereas
Bataille’s Nietzsche is the exemplar of Dionysian
ecstasy in The Anti-Christ (1888/1954b). This latter
aspect is approached more indirectly by Foucault
in his last lectures addressing “technologies” of
spiritual transformation in the post-Socratics.
4. There is no suggestion here that Foucault, or for that
matter Hadot, would have been personally interested
in the more elaborated spiritual schools of Gurdjieff
or Almaas. What does seem well supported are
the similarities of these more recent forms of this-

Foucault and Hadot on This-Worldly Mysticism

worldly spirituality, in both their core practices
and understandings of self-identity as presence, to
the earlier schools of the Stoics and Epicureans so
central for both philosophers.
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